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MISCELLANEOUS
I. DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE
A. Solicitation
On May 30, 1978, the United States Supreme Court set a
significant precedent by reversing the South Carolina Supreme
Court's decision in In re Edna Smith Primus, I an attorney disci-
plinary action. Along with its companion case, Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar, I In re Primus further defines the parameters of first
and fourteenth amendment speech and associational protections
afforded attorney communications with nonclients.
The disciplinary action brought against Mrs. Primus arose in
the context of a civil action involving an Aiken, South Carolina,
physician. In July 1973, Mrs. Primus, in her capacity as legal
consultant for the South Carolina Counsel on .Human Relations,
met with Mrs. Marrietta Williams and other women to discuss
their rights against Dr. Clovis Pierce, who had sterilized the
women after allegedly threatening to withhold Medicaid benefits
if they did not consent to the procedure. At this meeting they
discussed the possibility of a class action suit against Dr. Pierce.
Mrs. Williams later received a letter signed by Mrs. Primus. It
said that the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was inter-
ested in filing the lawsuit on her behalf.3 As a result of the meet-
ing with the potential plaintiffs and the subsequent letter sent to
Mrs. Williams, suit was instituted against Dr. Pierce.4
After instigation of this litigation the South Carolina Board
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline filed a complaint
against Mrs. Primus and disciplinary proceedings began. The
Board issued a private reprimand based on its finding that Mrs.
Primus had violated the Code of Professional Responsibility."
Mrs. Primus, in addition to her capacity as legal consultant
to the South Carolina Council on Human Relations, was, at the
time of the Pierce litigation, also an officer and cooperating attor-
ney with the ACLU. In its findings of fact the Board held that
1. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
2. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
3. In re Smith, 268 S.C. 259, 262, 233 S.E.2d 301, 302 (1977).
4. See Walker v. Pierce, 560 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1977).
5. 268 S.C. at 269, 223 S.E.2d at 306. The South Carolina version of the Code of
Professional Responsibility applied to appellant is the one as amended by the House of
Delegates of the American Bar Association on February 24, 1970. See S.C. SuP. CT. R. 32
(Cum. Supp. 1977).
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Mrs. Primus had solicited Mrs. Williams, if not on her own be-
half, on behalf of the ACLU.' The Board also found that while the
ACLU had formerly been reimbursed only from damages that
might eventually be awarded plaintiffs in the cases the ACLU
entered, it had begun to ask for fees in addition to and apart from
damages.'
The Board thus considered Mrs. Primus' conduct a violation
of the Code's Disciplinary Rule 2-104(A)(5), 8 which provides:
(A) A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman
that he should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not ac-
cept employment resulting from that advice, except that:
(5) If success in asserting rights or defenses of his client
in litigation in the nature of class action is dependent upon the
joinder of others, a lawyer may accept, but shall not seek, em-
ployment from those contacted for the purpose of obtaining
their joinder.
Moreover, Mrs. Primus' conduct was found to violate Discipli-
nary Rule 2-103(D)(5)(a) & (c)9 providing:
(D) A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a person or organi-
zation that recommends, furnishes, or pays for legal services to
promote the use of his services or those of his partner or asso-
ciates. However, he may cooperate in a dignified manner with
legal service activities of any of the following ....
(5) Any other non-profit organization that recommends,
furnishes or pays for legal services to its members or beneficiar-
ies, but only in those instances and to the extent that controlling
constitutional interpretation at the time of the rendition of the
service requires the allowance of such legal activities, and only
if the following conditions, unless prohibited by such interpreta-
tions are met:
(a) The primary purposes of such organizations do
not include the rendition of legal services.
(c) Such organization does not derive a financial
benefit from the rendition of legal services by the lawyer.
The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the Board's find-
6. 268 S.C. at 263, 223 S.E.2d at 303.
7. Id.
8. S.C. SUP. CT. R. 32 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
9. Id.
[Vol. 30
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ings,'" but raised the private reprimand issued by the Board to a
public reprimand."
Mrs. Primus appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
claiming that the first and fourteenth amendments protected the
sort of solicitation she undertook. In stating her position, she
relied on the rationale of a line of United States Supreme Court
cases that began with NAACP v. Button.'2
NAACP v. Button arose from the NAACP's challenge of Vir-
ginia's school segregation policies. The named individual plain-
tiffs were not members of the NAACP, but the NAACP contacted
and advised them in a manner similar to the way Attorney Pri-
mus approached and counseled Mrs. Williams.'3 Staff attorneys
of the NAACP in the Virginia litigation were paid from a fund set
up by the organization for these purposes. The United States
Supreme Court in Button reversed the Virginia Supreme Court's
decision that had held that the activity was criminal solicitation
under Virginia law.'4 The Supreme Court found that the first and
fourteenth amendments protected the group arrangement uti-
lized in Button and that Virginia could not constitutionally regu-
late it.'" The Supreme Court later extended these first and four-
teenth amendment protections to the legal aid plans of unions.
Under these plans, union members with legal problems were re-
ferred to attorneys whom the unions had either hired'" or ap-
proved.'7
The drafters of the Code of Professional Responsibility at-
tempted to lessen the impact of Button and its progeny by
construing the cases narrowly and prohibiting any form of solici-
tation not explicitly protected.'" Thus, Primus illustrates the con-
flict between the efforts of the organized bar to minimize solicita-
tion by lawyers and the United States Supreme Court's attempts
10. 268 S.C. at 269, 223 S.E.2d at 306.
11. Id.
12. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
13. Compare NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 420-22, with In re Smith, 268 S.C. at
262, 233 S.E.2d at 302.
14. 371 U.S. at 442-45.
15. Id.
16. UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
17. United Trans. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971); Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
18. See Freedman, Advertising and Solicitation by Lawyers: A Proposed Redraft of
Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 4 HoFsTRA L. REv. 183, 186 (1976);
Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel
Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181, 1186 (1971).
1979]
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to constitutionally protect attorney solicitation, at least insofar as
solicitation gives court access to people who would otherwise not
have it.
In reversing the South Carolina Supreme Court's ruling, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that South Carolina's
application of the disciplinary rules to appellant Primus' conduct
violated the first and fourteenth amendments.'" Writing for the
majority, Justice Powell relied on the Button principle that
"collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the
courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First
Amendment""0 and held that "[flor the ACLU, as well as for the
NAACP, 'litigation is not a technique of resolving private differ-
ences'; it is 'a form of political expression' and 'political associa-
tion."'
Justice Powell rejected the Board's attempted distinctions
between Button and In re Primus, noting initially that it was
nowhere seriously argued that Appellant herself had received any
significant financial gain. As for the ACLU's alleged financial
benefit, Justice Powell pointed out that even though the ACLU
had begun to request awards of attorneys' fees, the fees went into
a central fund similar to the fund in Button, that the NAACP also
had made similar requests, and that at the time of the letter to
Mrs. Williams, it was ACLU policy that no staff attorney should
receive payment from damages obtained in the case."
Because first amendment rights of political expression and
association were at issue, Justice Powell stated that strict scru-
tiny principles applied. 23 He interpreted DR 2-103(D)(5) to be
overly broad as applied. This was especially true because the
State asserted in oral argument that if anyone in the ACLU were
ultimately to be involved in the litigation, no one in the ACLU
could communicate the willingness of the organization to handle
the case without being guilty of solicitation - even if only legal
advice had been given at the initial meeting with Mrs. Williams. 4
Moreover, Justice Powell perceived a danger of censorship
19. 436 U.S. at 439.
20. Id. at 426 (quoting Justice Black's summary of Button in United Trans. Union
v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971)).
21. 436 U.S. at 428 (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at 429, 431).
22. 436 U.S. at 429, 430 n.24.
23. Id. at 432-33.
24. Id. at 433. See also Baker, Do Lawyers Have a First Amendment Right to Solicit?,
64 AB.A.J. 364, 370 (1978).
[Vol. 30
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through selective enforcement of the overly broad disciplinary
rules.25
Justice Powell carefully distinguished the Ohralik case de-
cided the same day. In that case, an Ohio lawyer had been sus-
pended from practice for personally approaching an auto accident
victim in her hospital room and offering to represent her. 26 Be-
cause the in-person solicitation in Ohralik had been for personal
gain, the conduct described more nearly fit the traditional de-
scriptions of champerty and maintenance. For that reason,
Ohralik allowed a mere showing of potential danger by the state
to suffice for it to be able legitimately to discipline the conduct."
In the one dissenting opinion in Primus, Justice Rehnquist
stated that the disciplined conduct in Ohralik and Primus was
essentially the same; that is, uninvited solicitation:
Neither Button nor any other decision of this Court compels
a state to permit an attorney to engage in uninvited solicitation
on an individual basis. Further, I agree with the Court's state-
ment in the companion case Ohralik that the State has a strong
interest in forestalling the evils that result "when a lawyer, a
professional trained in the art of persuasion, personally solicits
an unsophisticated, injured or distressed lay person."'
Justice Rehnquist further distinguished Button by noting that
the staff lawyers of the NAACP had played a limited role in the
solicitation and also that Virginia had not instituted suit against
the individual lawyers.29 The majority expressly rejected this nar-
row reading."
Justice Rehnquist also pointed out that an overzealous civil
liberties attorney might be just as dangerous to the best interests
of the potential plaintiff as an attorney who stirs up litigation for
his own financial gain." This same consideration, however, would
seemingly have applied in Button; yet the Court did not find it
weighty enough to allow state intervention in the area of pro-
tected rights of expression and association.
The ultimate precedential value of In re Primus is difficult
to predict because the American Bar Association revised the Code
25. 436 U.S. at 432-3a.
26. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 452-54 (1978).
27. In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 422, 438-39.
28. Id. at 441.
29. Id. at 444 n.3.
30. Id. at 425 n.16.
31. Id. at 445-46.
1979]
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' while Primus was being litigated. 32 Although the South Carolina
32. ABA, SUMMARY OF AcMION OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 4 (1975 Midyear Meeting).
Disciplinary Rule 2-103(D)(4) was amended to the following form:
(D) A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a person or organization that furnishes
or pays for legal services to others to promote the use of his services or those of
his partner or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm except
as permitted in DR 2-101(B) [permitting dignified identification of the lawyer
as a lawyer in certain circumstances, as in political advertisements, in public
notices required by law, and in legal documents]. However, this does not pro-
hibit a lawyer or his partner or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him
or his firm from being recommended, employed or paid by, or cooperating with,
one of the following offices or organizations that promote the use of his services
or those of his partner or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or
his firm if there is not interference with the exercise of independent, professional
judgment in behalf of his client:
(4) Any bona fide organization that recommends, furnishes or pays for legal
services to its members or beneficiaries, provided the following conditions are
satisfied:
(a) Such organization, including any affiliate, is so organized and oper-
ated that no profit is derived by it from the rendition of legal services by
lawyers, and that, if the organization is organized for profit, the legal
services are not rendered by lawyers employed, directed, supervised, or
selected by it except in connection with matters where such organization
bears ultimate liability of its member or beneficiary.
(b) Neither the lawyer, nor his partner, nor associate, nor any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, nor any other non-lawyer, shall
have initiated or promoted such organization for the primary purpose of
providing financial or other benefit to such lawyer, partner, associate or
affiliated lawyer.
(c) Such organization is not operated for the purpose of procuring legal
work or financial benefit for any lawyer as a private practitioner outside
of the legal services program of the organization.
(d) The member or beneficiary to whom the legal services are furnished,
and not such organization, is recognized as the client of the lawyer in the
matter.
(e) Any member or beneficiary who is entitled to have legal services
furnished or paid for by the organization may, if such member or benefici-
ary so desires, select counsel other than that furnished, selected or ap-
proved by the organization for the particular matter involved; and the
legal service plan of such organization provides appropriate relief for any
member or beneficiary who asserts a claim that representation by counsel
furnished, selected or approved would be unethical, improper, or inade-
quate under the circumstances of the matter involved and the plan pro-
vides an appropriate procedure for seeking such relief.
(f) The lawyer does not know or have cause to know that such organiza-
tion is in violation of applicable laws, rules of court and other legal re-
quirements that govern its legal services operations.
(g) Such organization has filed with the appropriate disciplinary au-
thority at least annually a report with respect to its legal services plan,
if any, showing its terms, schedule of benefits, its subscription charges,
agreements with counsel, and financial results of its legal service activi-
6
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Supreme Court has not adopted the revisions of the Code, several
states have. 3 The revisions of DR 2-103 might have permitted
solicitation of the kind engaged in by appellant Primus if they
had applied at the time. The revisions provide that an attorney
may assist an organization that pays for legal services to its bene-
ficiaries so long as neither the attorney nor the organization has
the generation of a profit as its primary purpose in rendering the
services and so long as the beneficiaries of the services are recog-
nized as clients who are free to seek legal services from other
sources. 4 The trend of judicial decision3 and the criticism of
various commentators" prompted the revisions.
The United States Supreme Court established in Ohralik
and Primus that while states may regulate and discipline attor-
ney solicitation traditionally associated with champerty and
maintenance, they may not regulate or discipline solicitation
undertaken merely to give litigants meaningful access to the
courts. The Court has decisively rejected a narrow reading of
Button. Notwithstanding apparent difficulties in differentiating
prohibited from protected solicitation and Justice Rehnquist's
fear that ambulance-chasing lawyers will henceforth claim the
constitutional protections of political association in disciplinary
proceedings against them, the key concepts in distinguishing
ties or, if it has failed to do so, the lawyer does not know or have cause
to know of such failure.
Id. at 4-7.
The Code was amended again in 1977. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
AMENDMENTS, 46 U.S.L.W. 1 (Aug. 23, 1977), wherein DR 2-103(D) was amended to read:
(D) A lawyer or his partner or associate or any otherlawyer affiliated with him
or his firm may cooperate with, one of the following offices or organizations that
promote the use of his services or those of his partner or associate or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm if there is no interference with the exercise
of independent professional judgment on behalf of his client.
The revision merely restates what is permitted in the 1975 version without stating it as
an exception to what is prohibited. Because subsections (4)(a)-(g) were readopted verba-
tim, the 1977 revisions did not significantly change the 1975 revisions.
33. NEW YORK JUD. LAW app. DR 2-103 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (McKinney) recognizes
the 1976 revisions of the Code. Several states have adopted the 1977 revisions. See GA.
CODE ANN. tit. 9 app. at 51, 55-56 (Cum. Supp. 1978); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 2-103 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (Purdon); R.I. GEN. LAWS Sup.
Ct. Rule 47, DR 2-103 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See also Ky. REv. STAT. § 18 RAP 3.130 (Cum.
Supp. 1977) (adopting 1977 revisions by implication).
34. See note 32 supra.
35. See generally discussion accompanying notes 12-17 supra; see also Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
36. See generally articles cited in note 18 supra; see also Attorney Advertising: Bates'
Impact on Regulation, 29 S.C.L. REV. 457, 463-77 (1978).
1979]
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Ohralik from Primus seem to be group association and, from the
attorney's standpoint, personal gain. The presence of the former
and the absence of the latter suggest that the danger to the public
and the courts will be minimal. Hence, the Code's purpose of
making legal services available will be advanced in a meaningful
way.
B. Attorney Misconduct Unrelated
to the Practice of Law
The South Carolina Supreme Court decided two cases in
1977 in which disciplinary action was taken against attorneys for
misconduct outside of their professional capacities. The two
cases, In re McDonald,37 and In re Boineau,11 seem very similar,
yet in disposing of them, the court reached different results. Res-
pondent in In re McDonald had pleaded guilty to two separate
incidents involving lascivious conduct with children. The Board
filed a complaint alleging that the crimes involved moral turpi-
tude and, therefore, constitute "misconduct" as defined by Rule
4(c) of the Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. 9 Respondent did not
contest the complaint, but asked the supreme court to accept his
tender of resignation from the South Carolina Bar. The Board
also recommended acceptance of respondent's resignation. A
majority of the court, however, found that the admitted conduct
warranted permanent disbarment. 0 In Boineau, on the other
hand, respondent's real estate broker's license had been revoked
because of dishonest conduct in his activities as a broker.4' The
Board's complaint recommended disbarment, but the supreme
court granted respondent's prayer that he be allowed to resign."
It has been long recognized that a lawyer might be disci-
plined for conduct unrelated to the practice of law.43 While the
South Carolina Supreme Court did not directly address the issue
until this year," the court noted in dicta in respondent Boineau's
37. 269 S.C. 598, 239 S.E.2d 83 (1977).
38. 269 S.C. 189, 236 S.E.2d 821 (1977).
39. S.C. SuP. CT. R., Arr'Y Discip. P. § 4(c) (1976).
40. 269 S.C. at 599, 239 S.E.2d at 83.
41. The conduct referred to includes various instances of fraud. South Carolina Real
Estate Comn'n. v. Boineau, 267 S.C. 574, 230 S.E.2d 440 (1976).
42. 269 S.C. at 190, 236 S.E.2d at 822.
43. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 1-102(A).
44. See In re Martin, 264 S.C. 1, 212 S.E.2d 251 (1974) (court indefinitely suspended
attorney after conviction for failure to file federal tax return, but without discussing fact
that conduct was unrelated to practice of law).
[Vol. 30
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1976 appeal from the revocation of his broker's license that disci-
plinary proceedings are appropriate in such a case." Moreover,
the language of section 4(d) of the Rules of Disciplinary Proce-
dure broadly prohibits misconduct in general, while leaving the
definition of what constitutes misconduct to the Board and the
supreme court.6
Practically the results of McDonald and Boineau are identi-
cal, because it is highly unlikely that either respondent will be
allowed to practice law in South Carolina again. The difference
in the treatment of the two cases is that respondent Boineau was
allowed to avoid the stigma of disbarment. Perhaps the reason
the court administered the more stringent penalty in McDonald
can be understood by examining the nature of the conduct in-
volved in the two cases. In McDonald, the conduct involved moral
turpitude, a term not given precise definition, but used to de-
scribe acts that are themselves immoral without regard to
whether criminal sanction may be imposed for the particular
act.47 The conduct involved in McDonald is criminal in nature,
and respondent received a prison sentence. The fraudulent con-
duct described in Boineau is not clearly criminal; although it
could conceivably be punished by imprisonment,"' apparently
such proceedings were not instituted.
The primary purpose of disbarment is to protect the court
and the public, not to punish the attorney.49 Because the appear-
ance of impropriety and the danger to the courts and the public
are considered more important than strict interpretations of
whether the conduct is criminal,10 there seems to be no readily
apparent policy reason for the different treatment of these two
cases. The commission of fraud and deceit in financial matters
impunes an attorney's fitness to practice law no less than the
commission of lewd acts. The court emphasized in Boineau that
while respondent was a member of the bar, he had never held
himself out as a lawyer or practiced law.5' Therefore, the need to
protect the public from an attorney's malfeasance in Boineau was
lessened. This factor, however, hardly distinguishes these two
cases enough to justify imposing two different penalties, because
45. 267 S.C. at 579, 230 S.E.2d at 442.
46. S.C. Sup. CT. R., Arr'Y Discip. P. § 4(d)(1976).
47. Pippin v. State, 197 Ala. 613, 616, 73 So. 340, 342 (1916).
48. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-23-30 (1976).
49. State v. Jennings, 161 S.C. 263, 266, 159 S.E. 627, 629 (1931).
50. Cf. Bums v. Clayton, 237 S.C. 316, 334, 117 S.E.2d 300, 309 (1960).
51. 269 S.C. at 190, 236 S.E.2d at 822 (1977).
19791
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McDonald, like Boineau, asked that his permanent resignation
be accepted. Resignation would protect the public and the courts
as well as would disbarment. Moreover, as Justice Gregory noted
in dissent in McDonald, respondent had practiced only briefly
and his conduct was wholly divorced from the practice of law
2
In the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, a flood of public
light was focused on the legal profession. This apparently brought
about a willingness on the part of the bench and the bar in various
jurisdictions to scrutinize more closely the extralegal conduct of
attorneys. Indeed, several states have directly instituted discipli-
nary proceedings against attorneys implicated in misconduct
connected with President Nixon's re-election in 1972.13 This more
exacting scrutiny has not been reserved for politically motivated
misconduct, however, and in the last several years the number-of
cases in which lawyers were disciplined for conduct outside of the
practice of law has grown." The courts recognize that an attor-
ney's duty to behave honestly and morally is greater than that of
the layman, because of the attorney's position of public trust.
55
South Carolina seems to be following this trend of heightened
scrutiny of attorney behavior.
52. 269 S.C. at 599, 239 S.E.2d at 83 (1977).
53. See, e.g., Segretti v. State Bar, 15 Cal. 3d 878, 544 P.2d 929, 126 Cal. Rptr. (1976)
(attorney disciplined for covert, deceitful activities designed to confuse candidates of
opposition party); State ex rel Neb. State Bar Ass'n v. Cook, 194 Neb. 364, 232 N.W.2d
120 (1975) (attorney disciplined for giving perjured testimony in the trial of Mitchell and
Maurice Stans); In re Nixon, 53 A.D.2d 178, 385 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1976) (attorney disciplined
for various instances of obstruction of justice).
54. See Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. McSween, 347 So. 2d 1118 (La. 1977) (attorney
suspended from practice for receiving funds from federally insured savings and loan asso-
ciation with intent to defraud); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Silk, 279 Md. 345, 369
A.2d 70 (1977) (attorney disbarred for misappropriating the funds of a club while serving
as president and treasurer); State ex rel Neb. State Bar Ass'n v. Ledwith, 197 Neb. 572,
250 N.W.2d 230 (1977) (attorney disbarred for conversion of funds of estate for which he
acted as both executor and attorney); In re Franklin, 71 N.J. 425, 365 A.2d 1361 (1976)
(attorney suspended from practice for submitting fraudulent expenses on weekly reports
to corporation of which he was president); In re Howe, 257 N.W.2d 420 (N.D. 1977)
(attorney suspended from practice for deliberately giving false information to insurance
and drivers license authorities); In re Stodd, 279 Or. 568, 563 P.2d 665 (1977) (attorney
suspended from practice for converting to his own use fund entrusted to him as president
of a nonprofit organization); cf. In re Conduct of Steffen, 279 Or. 313, 567 P.2d 544 (1977)
(deceit of attorney who falsely represented to policeman that he was employed at the
district attorney's office, although improper, did not merit reprimand). See also In re
DuPre, 270 S.C. 264, 241 S.E.2d 896 (1978) (attorney disbarred for writing checks on a
closed account in conjunction with other conduct related to practice of law).
55. See In re Conduct of Steffen, 279 Or. 313, 315, 567 P.2d 544, 545 (1977).
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11. BANKS AND BANKING: TiHE ROLE OF THE FDIC
In FDIC v. Godshall,56 defendant signed a promissory note
issued by American Bank & Trust for $65,500. The bank was
subsequently closed by the State Board of Bank Control, which
had determined that American Bank & Trust (AB&T) was un-
able to meet the demands of its depositors. The FDIC, by virtue
of its appointment by the State Board as receiver for the bank,
became the holder of the note. 57 Performing its duties as receiver,
the FDIC sold certain assets to Southern Bank & Trust in return
for that bank's assumption of AB&T's liabilities. The FDIC also
agreed to pay Southern Bank & Trust the difference between the
value of assets purchased and the amount of liability assumed.
To meet this obligation, the FDIC, in its capacity as receiver, sold
to itself, in its general corporate capacity, the remainder of the
assets of AB&T.5s
Among the assets sold was defendant's note. The FDIC
sought to collect it, bringing suit in the United States District
Court for the District of South Carolina. Defendant did not deny
his liability on the note, but challenged the subject matter juris-
diction of the court under a provision of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act,59 which reads in pertinent part:
All suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity to which
the Corporation shall be a party shall be deemed to arise under
the laws of the United States ... except that any such suit to
which the Corporation is a party in its capacity as receiver of a
State bank and which involves only the rights or obligations of
depositors, creditors, stockholders, and such State bank under
56. 558 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1977).
57. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-3-630 (1976) provides:
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation may, with the approval of the
State Board of Bank Control, be and act without bond as receiver or liquidator
of any banking institution the deposits in which are to any extent insured by
the Corporation and which shall have been closed on account of inability to meet
the demands of its depositors.
The State Board of Bank Control may, in the event of such closing, tender
to the Corporation the appointment as receiver or liquidator of such banking
institution and, if the Corporation accepts such appointment, it shall have all
the powers and privileges provided by the laws of this State with respect to a
receiver or liquidator of a banking institution, its depositors and other creditors
and be subject to all the duties of such receiver or liquidator.
58. The FDIC, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1823(d) (1975), may purchase from the
receiver the assets of a closed state bank that it insures if the sale is approved by appropri-
ate state authority. In this instance the receiver was the FDIC. See note 57 supra.
59. 12 U.S.C. § 1811-1831 (1975).
1979]
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State law shall not be deemed to arise under the laws of the
United States."
The first assertion in defendant's twofold argument against the
jurisdiction of the district court was that the FDIC, by merely
changing hats upon selling itself its own assets, had not truly
changed its character from that of receiver and retained receiver
status in its claim before the court. Defendant's second assertion
was that the claim raised legal issues that pertained solely to the
rights and obligations of AB&T's depositors, creditors, or stock-
holders under state law, and, therefore, the claim should "not be
deemed to arise under the laws of the United States."'"
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected both argu-
ments. Against the first, the court noted that in Freeling v.
Sebring,62 the Tenth Circuit held that the FDIC may act simulta-
neously in its corporate capacity and its receivership capacity.
Moreover, the court observed that excess recovery on the sold
assets was to go to the FDIC's corporate treasury and not the
receivership estate. Against defendant's second argument, the
court noted that the bank's depositors, creditors, and stockhold-
ers were not the only parties whose rights and obligations the suit
affected. Rather, the FDIC would absorb almost the entire finan-
cial impact of the suit, whether successful or unsuccessful. The
FDIC's loss of the suit would not affect the depositors, creditors,
and shareholders. Only if the FDIC won would these parties bene-
fit, and then only if the aggregate recoveries exceeded the liabili-
ties of the bank. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit found no merit
in defendant's jurisdictional challenge and upheld the district
court's judgment for the FDIC."3
The court observed in a footnote in Godshall that a Michigan
district court came to the opposite conclusion on defendant's first
argument. 4 That case, FDIC v. Ashley,65 was quite similar to
Godshall, and the court held that the FDIC continued to act as
60. Id. § 1819.
61. Id.
62. 296 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1961). This case held that federal jurisdiction was not
invoked when appellant sued to recover a deposit basing his claim on the failure of the
FDIC to comply with state law. There was no question of FDIC as receiver selling assets
to itself as a corporation, and apparently no one contested whether the FDIC as liquidat-
ing agent committed the acts complained of. The court found this to be precisely within
the protection of 12 U.S.C. § 1819.
63. 558 F.2d at 223.
64. Id. at n.8.
65. 408 F. Supp. 591 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
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receiver after it assigned assets to itself. According to that court,
the assignment facilitated the collection of outstanding debts and
the liquidation of assets, which is traditionally the job of the
receiver. The court stated:
If one looks to the substance of the transactions in the instant
case rather than to their form, it is clear that the FDIC proper
is performing a receiver's obligation when it sues on claims al-
leged here. In 12 U.S.C. § 1819, Congress has clearly expressed
its intent that in performing the function of receiver of a state
bank the FDIC should use the state courts.6
The Ashley rationale did not impress the Fourth Circuit.
Because of the Freeling holding that the FDIC may function in
two capacities, the assertion that the FDIC in its corporate capac-
ity must be held to jurisdictional limitations placed on the FDIC
as receiver is anomalous. 7 In Ashley the court apparently had
insisted on viewing the FDIC as a single entity in the transaction
and expressed a fear that, viewed otherwise, the FDIC, as a part
of the executive branch, could confer jurisdiction which Congress
did not intend on the federal courts, by simply making assign-
ments."6
Other federal district courts have rejected the Ashley ap-
proach to the FDIC's sales to itself of corporate assets. In FDIC
v. Design & Development Inc.,69 the federal district court of Wis-
consin looked to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act 0 and held
that it contemplates the receiver and the corporation as distinct
entities.71 In FDIC v. Abraham, 72 the federal district court of
Louisiana found, in a situation similar to Godshall, that merely
because some of the corporate FDIC's actions were similar to
those of a receiver, they did not deprive the court of jurisdiction
over the corporation. 3 In addition, that court found in the United
States Code an alternative jurisdictional basis for the FDIC.74
Section 1345 of title 28 gives original jurisdiction to district courts
66. Id. at 598.
67. Freeling, however, presented a more obvious case for federal jurisdiction because
it involved a suit by a depositor against the FDIC for the insured part of his deposits. 296
F.2d at 246. The Ashley court distinguishes Freeling on that basis. 408 F. Supp. at 596.
68. 408 F. Supp. at 598.
69. 73 F.R.D. 442 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
70. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1831 (1975).
71. 73 F.R.D. at 444.
72. 439 F. Supp. 1150 (D. La. 1977).
73. Id. at 1152-53.
74. Id. at 1154-55.
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in proceedings commenced by the United States or by agencies
authorized to sue by act of Congress.75 This hitherto largely un-
charted path into federal courts will doubtlessly facilitate the
FDIC's function as deposit insurer. Cases such as Godshall and
Abraham have probably invalidated jurisdictional defenses
against the corporate FDIC, or at least those based on the propo-
sition that the FDIC continues to act as receiver when it sues on
bills, notes, choses of action, or other assets that it has sold to
itself in its corporate capacity.
On the same day it decided Godshall, the Fourth Circuit, in
an opinion also written by Judge Winter, decided another case
arising from the closing and receivership of American Bank &
Trust, FDIC v. American Bank & Trust Shares, Inc.76 Among the
assets that the FDIC as receiver sold itself in its general corporate
capacity were certain choses in action, including claims against
the directors and officers of AB&T for acts of misfeasance and
nonfeasance harming the bank. The FDIC, in its general corpo-
rate capacity, instituted this suit against American Bank & Trust
Shares, Inc., the parent company of AB&T. The FDIC asked for
a declaratory judgment that it was the sole owner of the causes
of action.
At the time of the initiation of this suit, and shortly there-
after, a number of the shareholders of American Bank & Trust
Shares instituted derivative actions against the directors and offi-
cers of both AB&T and the parent company. The United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina enjoined these
suits and made the shareholders parties defendant in the declara-
tory judgment action. 7 The district court held, inter alia, that the
shareholders owned the causes of action that were based on fed-
eral securities law violations, except for claims based on section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.78 All other claims,
particularly those based on losses suffered by the bank because
of the mismanagement and negligence of its officers and direc-
tors, were held to belong to the bank itself, not to the sharehold-
ers. Hence, the FDIC in its corporate capacity had acquired all
rights to these actions.
79
75. 28 U.SC. § 1345 (1976).
76. 558 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1977).
77. FDIC v. American Bank & Trust Shares, Inc., 412 F. Supp. (D.S.C. 1976).
78. Id. at 308. Section 16(b) is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
79. 412 F. Supp. 302, 308 (D.S.C. 1976).
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The district court also noted that the counterclaims that the
shareholders asserted were nonderivative. The shareholders
claimed that the board of directors had committed fraud by in-
ducing them to purchase capital notes and that FDIC had done
so by inducing the -State Banking Control Board to appoint it as
receiver. The shareholders further claimed that the South Caro-
lina statutes allowing the FDIC to be appointed receiver and
allowing the acquisition of the assets were unconstitutional.
These counterclaims, however, were held to be subordinate to the
claims of the corporate FDIC for harm done to the bank and to
the claims of general creditors, in whose place the FDIC now
stood." The court, therefore, held that all shareholder claims
should be held in abeyance until further order - apparently
until after the FDIC settled its claims against the officers and
directors.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the holding of the
district court that the shareholders' counterclaims should await
the disposition of the FDIC's claims against the bank's officers
and directors.2 The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court
that the FDIC acquired apparent title to the choses in action, but
because proving these counterclaims would divest this title, there
was no certainty that the FDIC was the sole owner of the choses
until the counterclaims were adjudicated.
3
In upholding the district court's determination that the
causes of action under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 were not owned by the shareholders, the court noted
that while such actions are not derivative for purposes of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,84 section 16(b) provides that the
initial opportunity to sue for the recovery of inside profits belongs
to the corporation, that is, the bank. Because the FDIC now
owned the bank's rights, the shareholders could bring suit only if
the FDIC declined to do so.85
III. MECHANIC'S LIENS - Lis PENDENS
In Multiplex Building Corp., Inc. v. Lyles,"' respondent Mul-
80. Id. at 309.
81. Id.
82. 558 F.2d at 715.
83. Id.
84. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
85. 558 F.2d at 716.
86. 268 S.C. 577, 235 S.E.2d 133 (1977).
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tiplex sought to foreclose a mechanic's lien that it had previously
filed against appellant within the statutory six-month period. 7
Respondent had never filed a notice of pendency on the lien; and
Appellant sought to dissolve the lien because he believed the
failure to file the notice of pendency barred the lien's enforce-
ment.8" The trial court, following the findings of the master in
equity, refused to dissolve the lien, holding that the purpose of
the notice requirement was to give notice to purchasers or encum-
brancers. Appellant Lyles, who was a party to the action with
actual notice and who had not been damaged by the failure to
file, could not complain of the lack of notice since he had actual
knowledge of the suit. On appeal, the supreme court held that the
filing requirement could not be dispensed with under South Caro-
lina law.
The issue in Multiplex is the importance of the requirement
of the notice of pendency, or lis pendens, as applied to mechanic's
lien cases. Mechanic's liens are creatures of statute9 and the
mechanic's lien statutes vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion." In some states, courts have held that mechanic's lien stat-
utes should be strictly construed and their requirements strictly
enforced, because the statutes are in derogation of the common
law." Other courts have held that the statutes should be given a
liberal construction," at least after the lien attaches,93 so that the
statutes might not fail of their essential purpose, which is the
87. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-5-10, -120 (1976).
88. Id. § 29-5-120 provides in pertinent part: "Unless a suit for enforcing the lien is
commenced, and notice of pendency of the action is filed, within six months after the
person desiring to avail himself thereof ceases to labor or furnish labor or material for such
building or structures, the lien shall be dissolved." Id.
89. See, e.g., Springer Land Ass'n. v. Ford, 168 U.S. 513 (1897); Waters v. Dixie
Lumber & Mfg. Co., 106 Ga. 592, 32 S.E. 636 (1899); Freeform Pools, Inc. v. Strawbridge
Home for Boys, 228 Md. 297, 179 A.2d 683 (1962); Cain v. Rea, 159 Va. 446, 166 S.E. 478
(1932).
90. See generally Note, Burton Drywall, Inc. v. Kaufman, Pre-Lien Notice Require-
ments: An Exception?, 1977 Der. C.L. REV. 725, 728-29 (1977).
91. See, e.g., Partin v. Konsler Steel Co., 336 So. 2d 684 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976);
Cowherd & Sanderlin v. Modem Improvement Co., Inc., 142 So. 2d 786 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1962); Freeform Pools, Inc. v. Strawbridge Home for Boys, 228 Md. 297, 179 A.2d
683 (1962); Cox v. Hruza, 54 N.J. Super. 54, 148 A.2d 193 (1959); Glass v. Stark, 156 Wis.
21, 145 N.W. 236 (1914).
92. See, e.g., Packard Bell Elec. Corp. v. Theseus, Inc., 244 Cal. App. 2d 355, t3 Cal.
Rptr. 300 (1966); Empire Land & Canal Co. v. Engley, 18 Colo. 388, 33 P. 153 (1893);
Kettles v. Charter Mortgage Co., 337 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
93. See, e.g., Burton Drywall, Inc. v. Kaufman, 69 Mich. App. 85, 244 N.w.2d 367
(1976), rev'd on other grounds, 402 Mich. 366, 263 N.W.2d 249 (1978); Wallich Lumber
Co. v. Golds, 375 Mich. 323, 134 N.W.2d 722 (1965).
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protection of the interests materialmen and laborers have in the
value of materials furnished or services rendered by them.
In Multiplex respondent insisted that South Carolina Code
section 29-5-120,11 requiring the filing of both a suit for the en-
forcement of the lien and notice of pendency, should not be
strictly construed. Respondent argued that the statute should be
read in light of the purpose of the lis pendens requirement, which
is notifying innocent buyers or encumbrancers, and that this pur-
pose was satisfied because appellant, as a party to the action, had
actual notice.25 Attempting to frame the case as one of unjust
enrichment, respondent asserted that the mechanic's lien itself
was designed to protect mechanics and materialmen from the
default of persons to whom they had rendered valuable services."
Both parties cited a 1966 South Carolina Supreme Court
case, Jones v. South Carolina State Highway Department,"7 to
support their arguments. That case concerned the construction of
a reckless driving statute. Respondent cited language stating that
statutes should be given constructions consistent with their pol-
icy objectives. 8 Appellant, however, cited language in the same
paragraph of the opinion that said that literal constructions
should be adhered to if the statute is unambiguous.9
In finding for appellant, the South Carolina Supreme Court
seems to have taken a more landowner-oriented position on the
lis pendens requirement than have most jurisdictions. In view of
the policy goal behind liberal construction of the mechanic's lien
statutes, protecting suppliers of labor and materials, some courts
have held that purchasers or encumbrancers chargeable with con-
94. S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-5-120 (1976).
95. Brief for Appellant at 3, 4, Multiplex Bldg. Corp. v. Lyles, 268 S.C. 577, 235
S.E.2d 133 (1977).
96. Brief for Respondent at 5, 6, Multiplex Bldg. Corp. v. Lyles, 268 S.C. 577, 235
S.E.2d 133 (1977). Respondent particularly noted the language of General Air Condition-
ing Corp. v. Stuewe, 156 Kan. 182, 131 P.2d 638 (1942): "In our discussion we take note
of the rule that the mechanic's lien law is not to be strictly construed because in supposed
derogation of the common law." Id. at 184, 131 P.2d at 639. That case, however, concerned
the failure to file a lien statement as opposed to is pendens. Respondent also quoted Trane
Co. v. Wortham, 428 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968): "It is a rule of long standing that
mechanic's and materialmen's lien statutes of this state will be liberally construed for the
purposes of protecting laborers and materialmen." Id. at 419. That case was brought on
the issue of the validity of the assignment of a lienor's benefits.
97. 247 S.C. 132, 146 S.E.2d 166 (1966).
98. Brief for Respondent at 6, Multiplex Bldg. Corp. v. Lyles, 268 S.C. 577, 235
S.E.2d 133 (1977).
99. Brief for Appellant at 2, Multiplex Bldg. Corp. v. Lyles, 268 S.C. 577, 235 S.E.2d
133 (1977).
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structive notice of liens may not avail themselves of a failure by
the lien-holder to file notice of pendency.1'0 Constructive notice
might be inferred from the existence of the suit for foreclosure of
the lien,'0 ' or, at least in one case, from the mechanic's lien stat-
ute itself and its notice requirements.'02 Substantial authority
exists for holding that notice of pendency or other notice is not
required when a party has actual knowledge of the lien.'0 3 One
judge noted that to hold otherwise would be to exalt constructive
notice over actual notice.' 4 Michigan has developed a "direct
dealing exception": one dealing directly with the owner of prop-
erty need not give notice.' 5 Only two other states, New York' 6
and Florida, ' have authority requiring notice of pendency to be
timely filed before relief may be granted under the mechanic's
lien statute against a property owner with actual notice of the
lien. In New York the notice of pendency is regarded as a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite for relief.' 8
The supreme court, in finding for appellant and dissolving
the lien, construed the statute in a manner that seems to have
produced a harsh result. Respondent, however, is not without a
contractual damage remedy.' 9 In addition, the supreme court's
decision simply upheld the apparent legislative intent to keep
tight statutory control on the imposition of mechanic's liens."10
100. Sax v. Clark, 180 Cal. 287, 180 P. 821 (1919); Empire Land & Canal Co. v.
Engley, 18 Colo. 388, 33 P. 153 (1893); Washtenaw Lumber Co. v. Belding, 233 Mich. 608,
208 N.W. 152 (1926).
101. Sax v. Clark, 180 Cal. 287, 180 P. 821 (1919).
102. Empire Land & Canal Co. v. Engley, 18 Colo. 388, 33 P. 153 (1893).
103. Packard Bell Elec. Corp. v. Theseus Inc., 244 Cal. App. 2d 335, 53 Cal. Rptr.
300 (1966); Wallich Lumber Co. v. Golds, 375 Mich. 323, 134 N.W.2d 722 (1965).
104. Wallich Lumber Co. v. Golds, 375 Mich. 323, 326, 134 N.W.2d 722, 724 (1965).
105. Id. at 327, 134 N.W.2d at 725.
106. Siracusa v. Inch Corp., 164 Misc. 820, 298 N.Y.S. 878 (1937); Johnson v. Waldo
Griffiths, Inc., 144 Misc. 773, 259 N.Y.S. 386 (1932).
107. Adams v. Kenson Supply Co., 137 So. 2d 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Cowherd
& Sanderlin, Inc. v. Modem Improvement Co., 142 So. 2d 786 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962);
Trushin v. Brown, 132 So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
108. See Siracusa v. Inch Corp., 164 Misc. 820, 298 N.Y.S. 878 (1937); Johnson v.
Waldo Griffiths, Inc., 144 Misc. 773, 259 N.Y.S. 386 (1932).
109. Brief for Appellant at 13, Multiplex Bldg. Corp. v. Lyles, 268 S.C. 577, 235
S.E.2d 133 (1977).
110. Apparently without consideration of whom the requirement benefitted, the
South Carolina General Assembly amended § 45-262 of the 1952 code to impose the lis
pendens requirement in its present form, No. 167, 1957 S.C. Acts 181. One commentator
notes that the South Carolina mechanic's lien laws more or less stack the deck in favor of
the property owner to the detriment of contractors and mechanics. See generally, Note,
Mechanic's Liens in South Carolina, 25 S.C.L. REv. 817, 854-61 (1974).
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The court quoted a Florida case, Trushin v. Brown,"' in-which the
same issue was considered:
Although the wisdom of the requirement in all mechanic's lien
foreclosures for the filing of a notice of the pendency of an ac-
tion, where the rights of third parties are not involved, may be
questionable, nevertheless we feel it our duty to construe the
statute in the light of its clear and unambiguous terms."1
2
The mechanic's lien is itself an extraordinary remedy. It is an in
rem right that not only encumbers the sale of realty, but can also
subject realty to sale for settlement of a contractual claim. In that
respect, the lien is somewhat like a mortgage arising from the
rendering of services."' Because of the nature of the remedy, the
requirement of strict adherence to statutory requirements may
well be justified.
Philip S. Porter
111. 132 So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
112. Id. at 359.
113. 10 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, § 5186
(Repl. Vol. 1957).
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